The problem of cyber attacks with bounded sensor reading edits for partially-observed discrete event systems is considered. An operator observes a plant through an observation mask that does not allow him to detect the occurrence of certain events (silent events). The observation is corrupted by an attacker who can insert and erase some sensor readings. The operator observes the system evolution in order to validate if a state in a given set of unsafe states is reached. The attacker corrupts the observation with the aim of preventing the operator to verify when an interesting state has been reached. Furthermore, the attacker wants to remain stealthy, namely he wants the operator does not realize that someone is corrupting his observation. An automaton, called attack structure is proposed, which supports the attacker in defining an effective attack. In more detail, first, the unbounded attack structure is obtained by doing the concurrent composition of two state observers, the attacker observer and the operator observer. Then, the n-bounded attack structure, for a given integer value of n, is obtained by doing the concurrent composition of the unbounded attack structure and an n-bounded attack automaton. Finally, the n-bounded attack structure can be made supremal and stealthy by appropriately trimming the previous attack structure. A stealthy attacker can elaborate his strategy looking at the supremal stealthy attack substructure and may result in different degrees of effectiveness: strong, weak or vain. The proposed approach can be dually used to verify if such an attack could be effective for the given system, thus to establish if the system is safe under attack.
Introduction
Cyber-physical systems (CPS) arise from the interaction of physical processes, computational resources and communication capabilities. Examples of CPS include transportation systems, medical monitoring, power generation and distribution systems, process control systems, advanced communication systems, etc. [1] . With the extensive applications of CPS, there are higher risks for the systems to suffer attacks from malicious agents.
Mainly inspired by some recent works [12] , [13] , [14] , [15] , we address the problem of cyber attacks with bounded sensor reading edits for partially-observed discrete event systems. In [12] , the authors present a new finite structure called parallel observer, which allows to simultaneously describe the observations of the supervisor and of the attacker. Based on the parallel observer, a maximally permissive supervisor is developed to enforce current-state opacity. Recently, the authors of [13] propose a novel bipartite transition structure in the framework of discrete event systems, namely, Insertion-Deletion Attack Structure, and present a game-like relationship between the supervisor and the environment (the plant and the attacker). The attacker can lead the plant to the unsafe critical states without being detected by the supervisor.
In [14] , the authors propose a defense policy that prevents cyber attacks at sensor and actuator layer in supervisory control systems. It is assumed that the attacker can alter the observation of events in a set of events Σ vs , and modify the enabling of events in a set of events Σ va . The detectable network attack security and undetectable network attack security are introduced to prevent the plant from reaching the unsafe states. We finally recall that in [15] the author proposes the problem of attack-with-bounded-sensor-reading-alteration (ABSRA), where the attacker can intercept the sensor readings from the plant and arbitrarily alter them but with an upper bound on the length of the altered observation string. In this way the attacker can cheat the supervisor, which will lead the plant to the undesirable states. The author also develops a supervisor that is robust to ABSRA.
In this paper that is a journal version of [16] 1 , we consider a plant modeled as a discrete event system, whose evolution is observed by an operator. The occurrence of a subset of events, called observable events, can be detected by sensors while all other events, called silent events, produce no observation. We assume that sensor readings may be corrupted by an attacker. This could happen because either the attacker can gain direct control of a sensor or it can corrupt messages between the plant and the operator (assuming they are connected through a network).
The operator observes the system evolution in order to verify if a state in a given set of unsafe states is reached. The attacker corrupts the observation with the aim of preventing the operator to establish when an unsafe state is reached. The attacker is required to be stealthy, i.e., the operator should not be able to detect that the plant is under attack. In addition, we fix an upper bound on the number of consecutive observations that can be added by the attacker within the occurrence of two observable events in the plant.
We model the plant as a partially observed automaton and assume that a set of observable events can be compromised by an attacker. In particular, the attacker may insert in the string observed by the operator fake occurrences of compromised events or, on the contrary, may erase the occurrence of compromised events. In this paper, we show how to design a supremal stealthy attack substructure, which allows the attacker to compute (if it exists) a policy that prevents the operator to realize when an unsafe state is reached, without revealing his presence. The attack structure simultaneously keep into account the set of states consistent with the real observation produced by the plant and the set of states consistent with the corrupted observation. It allows the attacker to elaborate an attack strategy that allows him, if possible, to reach his goal without being discovered thanks to stealthyness. Finally, the supremalness of the attack structure guarantees the maximally permissive behaviour in terms of corrupted observations, given the constraints in the number of events that can be consecutively inserted, and the fact that the attacker should remain stealthy.
We notice that, the proposed approach allows, dually, to evaluate the robustness of the system observation with respect to attacks in the considered setting.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce some background on finite-state automata and recall the fundamental notion of observer. In Section 3, the attack model considered in the paper is presented. In Section 4, the problem statement is given. In Section 5, we develop two observers: attacker observer and operator observer. In Section 6, we define the unbounded attack structure as the concurrent composition of such observers. Then, we define an automaton that allows us, again via concurrent composition, to define a bounded attack structure, starting from the unbounded one. In Section 7, a way to refine such structures in order to find a supremal stealthy attack substructure is detailed. The notion of stealthy attack function associated with a given supremal stealthy attack substructure, is introduced in Section 8. The supremal stealthy attack substructure defines all the possible stealthy attacks that can be obtained in the considered setting. A characterization of the situations in which it is possible to select a strong or a weak attacker starting from the previous attack structure is discussed in Section 9. Conclusions are finally drawn in Section 10 where we also discuss our future lines of research in this framework.
Preliminaries
A deterministic finite-state automaton (DFA) is a four-tuple G = (X, E, δ, x 0 ), where X is the set of states, E is the set of events (alphabet), δ : X × E → X is the transition function, and x 0 is the initial state. The transition function can be extended to δ * : X × E * → X such that δ * (x, ε) = x, and δ * (x, σe) = δ(δ * (x, σ), e) for all x ∈ X, e ∈ E and σ ∈ E * . The generated language of G is defined as L(G) = {σ ∈ E * |δ * (x 0 , σ) is defined}. Given two alphabets E and E with E ⊆ E, the natural projection on E , P E : E * → E is defined as [17] :
Therefore, given a word σ ∈ E * , its natural projection on E is obtained by erasing events that do not belong to E . The concurrent composition of two languages is defined as
The concurrent composition operator is also applicable to DFA. In particular, given two DFA G and G , their concurrent composition, denoted as
A partially-observed deterministic finite-state automaton is denoted as G = (X, E, δ, x 0 ), where E = E o ∪ E uo , E o is the set of observable events, and E uo is the set of unobservable events. In the following, to keep the notation simple, we denote as P :
The unobservable reach of a state x ∈ X, denoted by U R(x), is defined as a set of states x ∈ X reached from state x by executing an unobservable string σ ∈ E * uo , δ * (x, σ) = x }. The definition can be extended to a set of states B ⊆ 2 X as follows:
The observer Obs(G) of a partially-observed plant G is a DFA [18] : Obs(G) = (B, E o , δ obs , b 0 ), where B ⊆ 2 X is the set of states, E o is the set of events, δ obs : B × E o → B is the transition function defined as: δ obs (b, e o ) := x∈b U R({x | δ(x, e o ) = x }), and b 0 := U R(x 0 ) is the initial state.
The classical model of a plant observed by an operator is shown in Fig. 1 , where σ is a string generated by the plant G. An operator observes the plant through an observation mask P , where P is the projection of σ over E 0 . The string observed by the operator is s = P (σ). Example 1 Consider a partially-observed plant G = (X, E, δ, x 0 ) in Fig. 2(a) , where E = E o ∪E uo , E o = {a, c, d, g}, and E uo = {b}. The corresponding observer of G is shown in Fig. 2(b) .
2 
Attack model
In this paper we consider a plant modeled by a partially observable DFA with set of observable events E o and set of unobservable events E uo . Referring to Fig. 3 , if σ is a string generated by the plant, the observed string is s = P (σ). An attacker may corrupt the output signals produced by the plant with the effect of inserting in the observation some events that did not occur, or erasing some events that have occurred. Such a corrupted observation is denoted as s (a sequence of events in E o ), and the plant operator constructs its state estimation based on s . Fig. 3 . A plant G under attack.
Definition 2 [13] The set of compromised events is denoted as E com ⊆ E o . It includes all the observable events that can be corrupted by the attacker, either inserting them in the operator observation, even if they have not actually occurred, or erasing them in the operator observation. 2
The definition of compromised events was first proposed in [13] . However, while in [13] the authors assume that all the compromised events can be inserted and erased by the attacker, here we slightly generalize the definition as follows.
The set of compromised events that can be inserted in the observer evolution is denoted as E ins , and the set of events that can be erased is denoted as E era . To keep the presentation general, we assume that E ins and E era are not necessarily disjoint.
The relationship among the different subsets of observable events E o is clarified in Fig. 4 . We now formally describe the action of the attacker in terms of two new types of events that it can generate. More precisely, even if it is possible to directly define the attacker as a finite-state transducer that "translates" an observed string s into a corrupted observation s (see Fig. 3 ), for a reason that will appear clear in the following, we prefer to characterize the attacker's action in terms of a new string defined on a so-called attack alphabet E a .
Definition 3
The attack alphabet is defined as E a = E o ∪E + ∪E − , and we assume that E o , E + , and E − are disjoint sets.
The set of inserted events is denoted as E + , namely E + = {e + | e ∈ E ins }. The occurrence of an event e + ∈ E + denotes the fact that the attacker inserts in the operator observation an event e ∈ E ins that has not occurred in reality.
The set of erased events is denoted as E − , namely E − = {e − | e ∈ E era }. The occurrence of an event e − ∈ E − denotes the fact that the attacker erases from the operator's observation event e ∈ E era generated by plant. 2
Given a bound n ∈ N ∪ {∞}, we define E ≤n + = {w + ∈ E * + | |w + | ≤ n} the set of strings on alphabet E + whose length does not exceed n. Note that if n = ∞ then E ≤n
Definition 4 Given a plant G with a set of compromised events E com = E ins ∪ E era , let n ∈ N ∪ {∞} be a bound. An n-bounded attacker can be defined by an attack function f n :
where eE
In Definition 4, condition (a) means that the attacker can insert a bounded string w + ∈ E ≤n + even if no event occurs in the plant. Condition (b) implies that if an event e ∈ E era occurs, the attacker can either erase event e or not erase it, and then insert a bounded string w + ∈ E ≤n + . If an event e ∈ E o \E era occurs, then the attacker can insert a bounded string w + ∈ E ≤n + after e.
We denote as F n the set of attack functions for a given n ∈ N ∪ {∞}.
Definition 5
The language modified by an attack function f n is called attack language. It is denoted as L(f n , G) and is defined as
The set of all the attack languages relative to a given n ∈ N ∪ {∞}, denoted as L(F n , G), is defined as
2 Given two integer numbers n and n , F n ⊆ F n if n ≤ n . Furthermore, F n ⊆ F ∞ for all n < ∞.
Definition 6
The reduction projectionP : E * a → E * o is defined as:
2
The internal structure of the attacker is visualized in Fig. 3 as a black box taking an observation s as an input and producing a corrupted observation s as an output. Such an internal structure is sketched in more detail in Fig. 5 . Here the observed string is s = P (σ) (a sequence of events in E o ). The attacker corrupts the observation according to the attack function f n , producing w ∈ L(f n , G) ⊆ E * a . Such a sequence is projected viaP on E o , generating a string s . The plant operator constructs its state estimation based on s .
Problem statement
We first introduce some key definitions that will be useful in the following to formalize the problem statement.
Definition 7
Consider a plant G with set of observable events E o and set of compromised events E com . An attacker with an attack function f n is said to be stealthy ifP (
In words, an attacker is stealthy if the set of words that an operator may observe when the system is under attack is contained in the set of words the operator may observe when no attack occurs. This guarantees that the operator does not realize that the plant is under attack.
We now assume that a set of unsafe states X us is given, which corresponds to an undesirable or dangerous condition for the plant G. The operator observes the plant with the objective of establishing if the plant is in an unsafe state or not, in order to eventually activate some appropriate action. The following definition provides a characterization of the attacker, depending on three different cases that may occur.
Definition 8 Let G = (X, E, δ, x 0 ) be a plant with set of observable events E o and Obs(G) = (B, E o , δ obs , b o ) be its observer. Let E com be the set of compromised events. Given a set of unsafe states X us ⊆ X, an attacker with an attack function f n is said to be:
X us , and δ *
• vain if it is neither weak nor strong.
An attacker that is either strong or weak is said to be effective.
2
According to the above definition, an attacker is strong if there exists at least one uncorrupted observation s whose set of consistent states is included in the set of unsafe states, while the set of states consistent with the corrupted observation s does not contain unsafe states. This implies that if a system evolves producing the uncorrupted observation s, then it reaches an unsafe state without the operator realizing it.
An attacker is weak if there exists at least one uncorrupted observation s whose set of consistent states contains some unsafe state but it is not included in the set of unsafe states, while the set of states consistent with the corrupted observation s does not contain unsafe states. This means that if a system evolves producing the uncorrupted observation s, then it may have reached an unsafe state without the operator realizing it.
Finally, if neither of the two cases occurs, the attacker is said to be vain.
Example 9
Consider the plant G and its observer Obs(G) in Fig. 2 already discussed in Example 2. Let X us = {5} and E ins = {c}.
Assume that the uncorrupted observation is s = aba. In such a case the plant is in state {5}. If the attacker inserts event c, the corrupted observation is s = abac and the operator thinks that the plant is in state {6}. In this case, the attacker is strong.
Let us now consider the plant G and its observer Obs(G ) in Fig. 6 .
, g}, and E uo = {b}. Let X us = {5} and E ins = {c}. Assume that the uncorrupted observation is s = aa. The set of states consistent with the observation s is equal to {4, 5}, thus it contains the unsafe state but it is not included in X us . If the attacker inserts event c, the corrupted observation is s = aac and the operator thinks that the plant is in state {6}, thus the attacker is weak: if the real state is {4} the attacker is not successful; if the real state is {5}, it is successful. 2
The goal of this paper is to provide a systematic approach to compute an attack function f n that defines a stealthy strong or a stealthy weak attacker. If a solution to such a problem exists, it means that the system is not robust to attacks in the considered setting. On the contrary, if a solution does not exist, safeness under attack is ensured.
Attacker Observer and Operator Observer
In this section we introduce two special structures, called Attacker Observer and Operator Observer, which are fundamental to derive the proposed solution to the above problem.
Attacker Observer
The attacker observer Obs att (G) describes all possible attack strings that can be generated by functions in F ∞ and the corresponding sets of consistent states of the system. Since attacks are performed by the attacker, he knows which observations originate from events that have really occurred on the plant (E o ), which observations have been erased (E − ), and which observations have been inserted (E + ). The attacker observer Obs att (G) can be constructed using Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Construction of the attacker observer Obs att (G)
Input: An observer Obs(G) = (B, E o , δ obs , b 0 ), E ins , and E era .
Output: An attacker observer
for all e ∈ E era , do
for all b ∈ B, do 5:
end if 8: end for 9: end for 10: for all e ∈ E ins , do 11: for all b ∈ B, do 12: δ att (b, e + ) = b; 13: end for 14: end for According to Algorithm 1, the set E a is initially computed and the transition function of Obs att (G) is initialized at δ att = δ obs . Indeed, events in E o are events actually occurring on the plant, thus when such events occur the attacker updates his state estimation according to the transition function of Obs(G).
Then, for all e ∈ E era and for all b ∈ B, whenever δ att (b, e) is defined, the algorithm imposes δ att (b, e − ) = δ att (b, e). Indeed, the attacker knows that e − corresponds to event e that has been canceled, thus the way he updates his estimation is the same in the case of e and e − .
Finally, for all events e ∈ E ins , and for all states b ∈ B, we add self-loops δ att (b, e + ) = b. Indeed, the attacker knows that events in E + are fake events that have not really occurred on the plant, thus he does not update his estimation based on them. In particular, self-loops correspond to the possibility of inserting an arbitrarily large number of such events, which is consistent with the fact that we are dealing with attack functions in F ∞ .
Example 10 Consider again the plant G in Example 2. Let E ins = {c, d}, and E era = {c, g}. The attacker observer constructed using Algorithm 1 is shown in Fig. 7(a) .
Since events c, g ∈ E era , and there is a transition labeled c from state {1, 2} to state {3} in the observer of the plant Obs(G), we add transitions labeled c and c − from state {1, 2} to state {3} in the attacker observer. Similar arguments can be used to explain transitions labeled c and c − from state {5} to state {6}, self-loops labeled g and g − at state {4}. Then, since c, d ∈ E ins , we add self-loops labeled c + and d + at all the states.
The following proposition provides a characterization of the language generated by Obs att (G).
Proposition 11 Let G be a plant with set of observable events E o , observer Obs(G) = (B, E o , δ obs , b 0 ), and sets of events E ins and E era . Let Obs att (G) be the attacker observer constructed using Algorithm 1. It holds that:
Proof. (a) Follows from the construction rules implemented in Algorithm 1. Indeed, Step 2 implies that L(Obs att (G)) contains all words that can be observed if no attack occurs. Steps 3-9 guarantee that all attacks resulting from the cancellation of events in E era are considered. Finally, Steps 10-14 guarantee that all attacks resulting from the insertion of an arbitrarily large number of events in E ins are taken into account.
(b) We prove this by induction on the length of s. If s = ε, the result follows from the fact that, by definition of attack function, it is f ∞ (ε) ∈ E ≤n + , and by Steps 10-14, events in E + lead to self-loops in Obs att (G).
Let us now consider a generic word s ∈ P (L(G)) with length greater than one, written as s = se, where s ∈ P (L(G)) and e ∈ E o . Assume the result holds for s. We prove that it also holds for s = se considering the following two possible cases.
If e ∈ E era , by the definition of attack function, w ∈ f∞∈F∞ f ∞ (s){e − , e}E ≤n + is true. According to Steps 3-9, events e and e − are dealt with in the same manner when defining the transition function δ att . Finally, as just pointed out, according to Steps 10-14, events in E + lead to self-loops in Obs att (G).
Finally, if e ∈ E o \ E era , by the definition of attack function, w ∈ f∞∈F∞ f ∞ (s)eE ≤n + is true. Thus the result follows from the fact that, according to Steps 10-14, events in E + lead to self-loops in Obs att (G) and events in E o are dealt with in the same manner in Obs att (G) and Obs(G). 2
Operator Observer
The operator observer Obs opr (G) generates two different sets of words. The first set includes all words on E * a that may either result from an uncorrupted observation of the plant or from a corrupted observation which keeps the attacker stealthy. The second set of words includes all the previous words continued with a symbol in E a so that the resulting word is not consistent with an uncorrupted observation. While the words in the first set lead to a set of states that according to the operator are consistent with the perceived observation, those in the second set lead to a dummy state denoted as b ∅ . The operator observer Obs opr (G) can be constructed using Algorithm 2, as shown below. end for 22: end for According to Algorithm 2, the set of states B opr = B ∪ {b ∅ } and the set of events E a are initially computed. Then, the transition function of Obs opr (G) is initialized at δ opr = δ obs . Indeed, events in E o are events actually occurring on the plant; when such events occur, the operator updates his state estimation according to the transition function of Obs(G).
Algorithm 2
Furthermore, for all e ∈ E ins and for all b ∈ B, we impose δ opr (b, e + ) = δ opr (b, e). Indeed, the operator does not distinguish between events in E + and the corresponding events in E ins . For all e ∈ E era and for all b ∈ B, we add self-loops δ opr (b, e − ) = b. Indeed, events in E − correspond to no observation by the operator.
Finally, for all the events e a ∈ E a that are not enabled at the generic state b ∈ B, let δ opr (b, e a ) = b ∅ . As a result, for all b ∈ B and for all e a ∈ E a , function δ opr (b, e a ) is defined. On the contrary, δ opr (b ∅ , e a ) is undefined for all e a ∈ E a .
In the following, the set of stealthy words on the attack alphabet E a is defined as:
It represents the set of words on E a that are consistent with observations of the plant without attack. Therefore, the observation of such words do not reveal the presence of the attacker.
Example 12 Consider again the plant G in Example 2. Let E ins = {c, d} and E era = {c, g}. The operator observer constructed using Algorithm 2 is visualized in Fig. 7(b) .
Since c, d ∈ E ins and there is a transition labeled c from state {1, 2} to state {3} in Obs(G), we add transitions labeled c and c + from state {1, 2} to state {3} in the operator observer. Similar arguments can be used to explain the transitions labeled c and c + from state {5} to state {6}, and the self-loops labeled d and d + at state {7}. Then, since c, g ∈ E era , we add self-loops labeled c − and g − at all the states. Finally, we add all the missing transitions to the new state b ∅ , which has no output arc. 2
The following proposition provides a characterization of the language generated by Obs opr (G).
Proposition 13
Let G be a plant with set of observable events E o , observer Obs(G) = (B, E o , δ obs , b 0 ), and sets of events E ins and E era . Let Obs opr (G) be the operator observer constructed by Algorithm 2. It holds that:
Proof. (a) Follows from Algorithm 2, and from the definitions of stealthy words and reduction projection. In more detail, Step 3 guarantees that all uncorrupted words belong to L(Obs opr (G) (b) We prove this by induction on the length of w. If w = ε, the result holds beingP (w) = ε.
Consider now a word w ∈ L(Obs opr (G)) with length greater than one. Assume w ∈ W s , and let w = w e a . Assume that the result holds for a generic w ∈ W s . By definition of reduction projection, it holds thatP (w) =P (w ){e, ε} beingP (e a ) = e if e a ∈ E o ∪ E + , andP (e a ) = ε if e a ∈ E − . Thus δ *
According to Algorithm 2 the transition function of Obs opr (G) starting for a generic state b ∈ B is defined in the same way in case of e and e + (Steps 6 and 7), while it corresponds to a self-loop in the case of e − ∈ E − (Step 13). As a result, we can conclude that δ * opr (b 0 , w) = δ * obs (b 0 ,P (w)). 
Unbounded and n-bounded attack structures
In this section we define a particular DFA, called attack structure, which enables the attacker to select an effective attack function. In particular, as detailed in the following, an attack structure is defined on alphabet E a and contains all the strings that can be generated by the plant, plus all the possible attack strings. The attacker, looking at the attack structure and following the evolution of the plant, establishes which actions he can perform to corrupt the operator observation.
Here we distinguish two different cases. In the first case, the attack function belongs to F ∞ . We call unbounded attack structure the corresponding DFA, denoted as A ∞ . In the second case, the attack function belongs to F n for a given n ∈ N. We call n-bounded attack structure the corresponding DFA and denote it as A n .
Unbounded attack structure
Let us first formalize the definition of A ∞ .
Definition 14
The unbounded attack structure A ∞ = (R, E a , δ a , r 0 ) w.r.t. G and E com is defined as A ∞ = Obs att (G)||Obs opr (G). 2
Example 15
Consider again the plant G in Example 10 whose attacker observer and operator observer are visualized in Figs. 7(a) and (b), respectively. The unbounded attack structure A ∞ built according to Definition 14 is shown in Fig. 8 (neglect for the moment the different colours associated with states). By inspecting the unbounded attack structure A ∞ in Fig. 8 , once event a occurs on the plant, the attacker executes event a on A ∞ starting from the initial state ({0}, {0}). Thus state ({1, 2}, {1, 2}) is reached. Now, the attacker may wait for a new event occurring on the plant, a or c in this case. Alternatively, the attacker may insert an event c or d in the operator observation, which correspond to execute c + or d + , respectively, in A ∞ . Finally, the attacker may erase event c in the operator observation, which corresponds to execute c − in A ∞ . 2
Theorem 16
Let G be a plant with attack alphabet E a and set of stealthy words W s . Let A ∞ = (R, E a , δ a , r 0 ) be its unbounded attack structure. It holds that:
Proof. (a) Follows from Propositions 11 and 13 and Definition 14. Indeed, by Proposition 11, it holds that L(Obs att (G)) = L(F ∞ , G) and by Proposition 13, it holds that L(Obs opr (G)) = W s ∪ W s E a . Since A ∞ is defined as the concurrent composition of two DFA, Obs att (G) and Obs opr (G), having the same alphabet, its language is equal to the intersection of the languages of the two DFA. As a result, it is In summary, Theorem 16 implies that, using the attack structure A ∞ as explained above, all possible attack functions in F ∞ may be implemented.
n-bounded attack structure
The n-bounded attack structure A n that allows to select all possible attack functions in F n , can be easily obtained starting from A ∞ . To this aim, a particular DFA, called n-bounded attack automaton, denoted as G n , is introduced. Then A n is obtained as the concurrent composition of A ∞ and G n .
Definition 17
The n-bounded attack automaton is a DFA: G n = (X, E a , δ, 0), where X = {0, 1, . . . , n} (n ∈ N), and the transition function is defined as follows:
∀i ∈ X, δ(i, e a ) := 0 if e a ∈ E a \ E + , ∀X\{n}, δ(i, e a ) := i + 1 if e a ∈ E + .
2 Fig. 9 shows the n-bounded attack automaton G n . As it can be seen, events in E a \ E + are enabled at any state. On the contrary, events in E + are enabled provided that they have not been already executed n times consecutively. Fig. 9 . n-bounded attack automaton Gn Theorem 18 Let G be a plant with attack alphabet E a and unbounded attack structure A ∞ = (R, E a , δ a , r 0 ). Let
> n}, where cons E+ (w) denotes the number of consecutive events in E + contained in the word w.
Proof. Follows from the fact that A n is defined as A n = A ∞ ||G n and G n limits to n the maximum number of consecutive events that the attacker can add to the operator observation. 2
Supremal stealthy attack substructure
In this section we show how an attack structure A (which may either be an unbounded or an n-bounded attack structure) should be appropriately trimmed to ensure that all the actions that an attacker may implement (erase or insert events) based on it, guarantee stealthyness. We call stealthy attack substructure the DFA resulting from the trimming operation and show that it is also "supremal", namely it generates all the possible corrupted observations that guarantee stealthyness.
Let us first introduce the notion of exposing and stealthy states of an attack structure.
Definition 19
Given an attack structure A = (R, E a , δ a , r 0 ) we define the set of exposing states as R e := {r = (b a , b a ) ∈ R | b a = b ∅ } and the set of stealthy states as R s = R \ R e . 2
An observation leading to an exposing state reveals the presence of an attacker to an operator observing the system's evolution. Note, however, that there may exist stealthy states from which an exposing state is necessarily reached following a particular evolution of the plant.
Example 20 Consider the unbounded attack structure A ∞ in Fig. 8 already considered in Example 15. When the stealthy state ({6}, {4}) is reached, the plant is in state {6}. At this point, event a ∈ E o \ E era may occur in the plant. Since the attacker can not erase event a, then the exposing state ({7}, {b ∅ }) is reached. The attacker may try to pre-empt the occurrence of event a inserting an event in E + = {c + , d + }. However, from ({6}, {4}) inserting any of these events also yields exposing state ({6}, {b ∅ }). 2
To formalize this notion, let us consider the function f : 2 Rs → 2 Rs defined for all R ⊆ R s as follows:
then either (b) e ∈ E era and δ a (r, e − ) ∈ R or (c) (∃e ∈ E ins ) δ a (r, e + ) ∈ R .
In words, the set f (R ) ⊆ R is the set of states from which a suitable attacker decision can prevent leaving R . In fact whenever the occurrence of an observable event e yields a new state not in R (condition (a)) it is possible to remain in R either by erasing this event (condition (b)) or by preempting its firing by inserting an event e + for some e ∈ E ins (condition (c)).
A fixed-point of f is a set R f ix ⊆ R s such that f (R f ix ) = R f ix . A suitable way to trim A to ensure stealthyness is that of computing a fix point R f ix ⊆ R s and removing from A all states not in R f ix : in such a case all states are stealthy and there exists a suitable action that allows the attacker to remain within this set.
We point out that function f is monotone, i.e., by definition for all R ⊆ R it holds that f (R ) ⊆ f (R ). Thus according to Tarski's fixed-point theorem [19] there exists a maximal fixed-point of f that we denote R * and can be computed as
in at most |R s | iterations [20] .
In addition, one can easily verify that, for all attack structures A, the set of states reachable without any attack
is a fixed-point of f since the occurrence of an event e ∈ E o does not lead out of this set: this ensures that R * ⊇ R 0 is not empty.
Trimming an attack structure A removing all states in R \ R * and all their input and output arcs will determine its supremal stealthy attack substructure.
Definition 21 Given an attack structure A = (R, E a , δ a , r 0 ) let R * be the maximal fixed-point of function f . The supremal stealthy attack substructure of A is A ss = (R * , E a , δ * a , r 0 ) where
In the following, set R * is called strongly stealthy region, and set R e = R \ R * is called weakly exposing region.
The weakly exposing region R e of an attack structure A can be computed using Algorithm 3 whose main steps can be explained as follows. First, we compute the set of exposing states R e . The weakly exposing region R e is initialized at R e , as well as set R new that is introduced to define a stop criterion on the algorithm. While set R new is not empty, Steps 5-12 are executed. In Step 5, R new is set equal to the empty set. Then (Step 6), states in R \ R e are considered. Let us call r the generic state in R \ R e . If -either there exists (Step 7) at least one transition labeled e ∈ E o \ E era that yields from r to a state in R e , and there does not exist a transition labeled e + yielding to a state not in R e , -or if for all the transitions e ∈ E era that lead to R e and such that e − also leads to R e , and there does not exist a transition e + ∈ E + that yields outside R e , then, we add state r to R new (Step 8) and to R e (Step 9).
Algorithm 3 runs until no new state can be added to R e (namely, it is R new = ∅).
Algorithm 3
Computation of the weakly exposing region R e Input: An attack structure A = (R, E a , δ a , r 0 ). Output: The weakly exposing region R e . 1:
Let R e := R e ; 4: while R new = ∅, do
5:
Let R new := ∅; 6: for all r ∈ R \ R e , do 7: if (∃e ∈ E o \ E era : δ a (r, e) ∈ R e , e + ∈ E + : δ a (r, e + ) / ∈ R e ) ∨ (∀e ∈ E era : δ a (r, e) ∈ R e , δ a (r, e − ) ∈ R e , e + ∈ E + : δ a (r, e + ) / ∈ R e ), then 8:
R e := R e ∪ {r};
10:
end if
11:
end for 12: end while Example 22 Consider again the partially-observed plant G = (X, E, δ, x 0 ) in Fig. 2(a) , where E o = {a, c, d, g}, and E uo = {b}. The unbounded attack structure A ∞ is shown in Fig. 8 .
Here, exposing states are highlighted in gray, while states in R e that are not exposing are highlighted in yellow.
To clarify how non-exposing states are added to R e according to Algorithm 3, let us consider state ({6}, {4}). Such a state is added to R e at Step 9. Indeed, there exists a transition labeled a ∈ E o \ E era that yields from ({6}, {4}) to a state in R e (in such a case the exposing state is ({7}, {b ∅ }), and there does not exist a transition in E + yielding to a state not in R e . 
Complexity analysis
Let us now discuss the computational complexity of computing the supremal stealthy n-bounded attack substructure A ss n .
Given a plant G with set of states X, the observer of the plant can be constructed in 2 |X| steps. The unbounded attack structure is obtained computing A ∞ = Obs att (G) Obs opr (G), thus A ∞ can be constructed in 2 |X| × 2 |X| steps.
Given an integer value n, the n-bounded attack structure is obtained by computing A n = A ∞ G n where G n is the n-bounded attack automaton. Therefore, A n can be constructed in 2 |X| × 2 |X| × (n + 1) steps.
Finally, the supremal stealthy n-bounded attack substructure A ss n is obtained by removing from the attack structure A n all the states in R e . Therefore, the complexity of constructing A ss n is O(2 2|X| × n). 
Stealthy attack function
In this section we introduce the key notion of stealthy attack function, to clarify how a stealthy attack substructure can be used by the attacker to select a corrupted observation that is stealthy. The fact that the attack substructure is supremal guarantees that all possible corrupted observations that ensure stealthyness could be actually selected.
To formalize the definition of stealthy attack function, the notion of preempting state should be preliminarily introduced.
Preempting states
Preempting states are states from which an event in E o should necessarily be preempted with the insertion of some events in the observation, otherwise the resulting attack is no more stealthy.
Definition 24
The set of preempting states of an attack structure A = (R, E a , δ a , r 0 ) is R p = {r ∈ R * | ∃e ∈ E o \ E era : δ a (r, e) ∈ R e , ∃e + ∈ E + : δ a (r, e + ) / ∈ R e }. 2
In words, a state r is preempting if there exists an observable event that is not erasable and that leads from r to the weakly exposing region R e , and there also exists at least one event in E + that leads outside R e starting from r. By definition, a state in R e is not a preempting state.
Example 25 Consider again the partially-observed plant G = (X, E, δ, x 0 ) in Fig. 2 (a) and its unbounded attack structure A ∞ in Fig. 8 .
There is only one preempting state in A ∞ , namely ({6}, {5}), which is marked with a double circle in Fig. 8 . Once state ({6}, {5}) is reached, event c should be inserted (c + in Fig. 8 ) to reach a state that is not in R e . 2
Note that an unbounded attack structure A ∞ may contain cycles consisting of events in E + only, and preempting states. This corresponds to an unfeasible situation in practice. Indeed, an attacker could not insert an infinite number of events between the occurrence of two consecutive events in the system. This well clarifies the requirement of dealing with a bounded attack structure. An example clarifying the above remark is provided in the following where, as a special case, the cycle is a self-loop.
Example 26 Consider the plant G = (X, E, δ, x 0 ) shown in Fig. 12 , where E o = {a, b} and E ins = {b}. The unbounded attack structure A ∞ is shown in Fig. 13 .
State ({0},{2}) is a preempting state, but there is a self-loop labeled b + with it. This means that the attacker has to add an infinite number of observations b before the occurrence of a to avoid entering into the exposing region. 2 
Stealthy attack function
The following definition formalizes the notion of stealthy attack function associated with a given attack structure.
Definition 27 Given a plant G with set of compromised events E com = E ins ∪ E era , let A ss = (R, E a , δ a , r 0 ) be a stealthy attack substructure and R p be the set of preempting states. A stealthy attacker can be defined by a stealthy attack function f : P (L(G)) → E * a , i.e., a function f to which can be associated a function χ : P (L(G)) → R such that:
where A(χ(s)) denotes the set of events enabled at χ(s).
In Definition 27, condition (a) means that the attacker can insert a bounded string w + ∈ E ≤n + even if no event occurs in the plant, provided that the state reached executing w in A ss is not in R p , namely it is not a preempting state. Indeed, if such a state is preempting, as explained in Subsection 8.1, the event that should be executed must be an event in E + . In other words, a preempting state could be visited when moving in A ss according to a certain attack function, but it could not be the state reached after inserting all the events in E + , just before the occurrence of a new observation.
Note that in this definition, differently from the definition of the attack function f n , we need to keep track of the state that is reached after w. Indeed, the set of future actions depends on that. This motivates the introduction of function χ.
Condition (b) implies that, if an event e occurs in the system, two different cases should be distinguished, namely e − ∈ A(χ(s)) or e − ∈ A(χ(s)). In the former case, e could not be cancelled by the attacker, who can only eventually add a certain number of events in E + with the constraints discussed at the previous item. In the latter case, e could either be canceled, and again a certain number of events in E + could be eventually added.
Strong or weak attacker selection
In this section we want to characterize the cases in which it is possible to select an effective (strong or weak) attacker from a given stealthy attack substructure. We first introduce some preliminary definitions.
Definition 28 Consider a stealthy attack substructure A = (R, E a , δ, r 0 ). Let X us be the set of unsafe states. The set of strong target states of A is
In words, a state is strong target if its first entry only includes unsafe states, while its second entry includes no unsafe state. If a strong target state is reached following in A the corrupted observation, it means that the plant enters an unsafe state but the operator does not realize it.
Definition 29 Consider a stealthy attack substructure A = (R, E a , δ, r 0 ). Let X us be the set of unsafe states. The set of weak target states of A is R wt :
In words, a state is weak target if its first entry contains both unsafe and safe states, while its second entry includes no unsafe state. If a weak target state is reached following in A the corrupted observation, it means that the plant may either be in an unsafe or in a safe state, but the operator thinks that the system is in a safe state.
Definition 30 Let A = (R, E a , δ a , r 0 ) be a stealthy attack substructure. We denote as A = (R, E a , δ a , r 0 ) and call it nonredundant stealthy attack substructure, the attack substructure where:
δ a (r, e) = not defined if r ∈ R p ∧ e ∈ E + , δ a (r, e) otherwise.
2 Therefore A = (R, E a , δ a , r 0 ) is obtained from A = (R, E a , δ a , r 0 ) removing those arcs that are redundant in the sense that they are never active when defining an attack function. In particular, these are the arcs exiting from a preempting state and labeled with an event e / ∈ E + .
Proposition 31 Let A = (R, E a , δ a , r 0 ) be a nonredundant stealthy attack substructure associated with the stealthy attack substructure A = (R, E a , δ a , r 0 ). It holds that:
• A strong attacker may be selected iff there exists w ∈ E * a in A such that r = δ * a (r 0 , w) is a strong target state.
• A weak attacker may be selected iff there exists w ∈ E * a in A such that r = δ * a (r 0 , w) is a weak target state.
• All possible attackers that may be selected are vain iff there does not exist w ∈ E * a in A such that r = δ * a (r 0 , w) is either a strong or a weak target state. 2
Proof. By Definition 27, events e / ∈ E + are not active at preempting states when a stealthy attack function is selected. Therefore, δ a simply describes "in a structural way", the set of possible corrupted observations. As a result, the three items trivially follow from Definitions 28 and 29.
Example 32 Consider again the partially-observed plant G = (X, E, δ, x 0 ) in Fig. 2(a) , where E o = {a, c, d, g} and E uo = {b}. Let X us = {5}. The supremal stealthy unbounded attack substructure A ss ∞ is shown in Fig. 14 . State ({5}, {6}), highlighted in green, is a strong target state. When such a state is reached following the attacked observation, the plant is in the unsafe state {5}, while the operator thinks that the plant is in state {6}. In such a case, the attack is successful. In particular, the successful attack can be realized by inserting event c (c + in Fig. 14) when the attack substructure is in state ({5}, {5}), namely when the plant is in state {5} and the operator knows that. 2
Example 33 Consider the plant G in Fig. 6 (a) already discussed in Example 9 where E o = {a, c, d, g} and E uo = {b}. Let E ins = {c, d}, E era = {c, g}, and X us = {5}. The supremal stealthy unbounded attack substructure A ss ∞ is depicted in Fig. 15 . The light green state ({4, 5}, {6}) is a weak target state. When such a state is reached in the attack substructure, it means that there are two states consistent with the uncorrupted observation, namely the safe state {4} and the unsafe state {5}. However, based on the corrupted observation, the operator thinks that the plant is in state {6}. This implies that there is some possibility that the attack is successful, but we cannot be sure of that. 2
Conclusions and future work
In this paper we investigate the problem of cyber attacks at the observation layer, for partially-observed discrete event systems. In more detail, an operator observes the system evolution with a certain observation mask, which depends on the sensors available on the system. The operator observation may be corrupted by an attacker. The corruption may be done by erasing some events that have occurred and/or inserting some events that have not actually occurred. It is possible to impose an upper bound on the number n of consecutive observations that can be added by the attacker within the occurrence of two observable events in the plant.
We show how to construct a supremal stealthy attack substructure that allows the attacker to realize all the corruptions on the observation that prevent the operator to understand when an unsafe state is reached. The way by which the attacks are generated guarantees that the operator never realizes that someone is corrupting his observation, namely the attacker remains stealthy.
As a future work, we plan to characterize and solve the same problem using Petri nets to understand if some advantages in terms of computational complexity can be obtained and if efficient solutions can also be computed for unbounded systems.
